Strategies that produce results over the course of 162 games don’t necessarily translate to the 12 wins required to taste champagne in the standard three-round Strat playoff format. I learned this the hard way with early playoff exits in each of my first three Octobers in my 20-team league.

Not until my fifth postseason appearances did I make a real breakthrough, and not until my seventh did I bring home a World Series ring.

Looking back, I don’t think my team’s overall talent level improved over time as much as shifting priorities allowed me to become a better roster architect. I learned to maximize each of the 25 spots on my playoff roster and to edit the roster in such a way that emphasized important traits for postseason success, sometimes at the expense of a few 
regular-season wins.

But as any baseball fan knows, even the best-laid plans can go astray. That’s because the difference between the optimal baseball strategy and the next-best strategy is infinitesimal. To win consistently, the manager can’t rely on one great personnel decision or even one great high-leverage decision in the heat of competition. Instead, the successful manager must stack one optimal strategy on top of another and rely on the cumulative effect of those decisions to carry the day.

I will share some of my philosophies about roster construction in this piece, but be warned: I do not consider myself a master dugout strategist. I’m probably about average, and in terms of credentials, I am entering my 15th season in a 20-team league, and I have eight postseason appearances on my résumé. I have managed probably less than half as many Strat games as most newsletter readers, so caveat emptor.

The postseason is not the time to bow to tradition, so set aside the notion of what constitutes a "traditional" lineup. The average game in a 20-team Strat league sees 38 batters per side make a plate appearance (my league averaged 38.1 PA per game in 2015 and 38.5 in the preceding two seasons), so give yourself the best chance at a comeback by sending your best hitters to the plate in the ninth inning against the other team’s fire-breathing closer. That will happen more often if you place top overall batters in the Nos. 1 and 2 positions, meaning they will be the 37th and 38th batters of the game. Even if those lineup spots come up in the eighth inning in a close game, that’s still a high-leverage situation against a top reliever, just probably not the closer.

On the whole, you will face stronger pitching staffs in the postseason, and high-quality staffs typically feature pitchers who don’t have as many natural home runs units or ballpark diamonds on their cards. Also, evidence presented by SOM World suggests you will see fewer hitter’s parks in October, further depressing home run chances. These conditions can be hazardous for the homer-happy team.

Additionally, relying on home runs to win becomes a lower-probability strategy if your team falls behind early. While the home run may be the ultimate equalizer in baseball, hitting one in the late innings against a wave of high-leverage, strikeout-machine relievers has become a decreasingly poor strategy.

In the early days of my Strat career, I built offenses around Adam Dunn, Curtis Granderson and other lefthanded hitters who would trash the below-average righthanded starters and relievers they would see regularly during the season. But the roles reversed in the postseason, when Dunn and Granderson became the marks for other managers. The reason is simple: For the majority of power-hitting lefthanded hitters, the left-on-left platoon split favors the pitcher to such an extent that the outcome of the at-bat is nearly a foregone conclusion: automatic out. And the bad news for batters like Dunn or Granderson is that nearly every playoff team will have a lefthanded reliever who allows few hit or on-base chances, and he will be available for all crucial late-inning situations. Consider this: The top 20 left-on-left relievers in the 2016 set average about 7 hit chances, 13 on-base chances and 37 strikeout chances versus lefties.

The best way to protect yourself in these situations is to either (1) focus on low-strikeout lefthanded hitters who have lots of hit chances versus lefties on their card, or (2) stock your bench with righthanded-hitting "enforcers" to discourage your opponent from bringing his lefty reliever into the game for fear that reliever will be pitted against a powerful righty batter. If you have a good team, then you probably have such righty batters lying around for platoon usage.

Like many managers, I like to prioritize defense at shortstop and catcher, even if I have to accept poor hitting in the deal. Ideally I’ll have a shortstop with at least a 2 range rating and a catcher with at least a —2 arm. One reason I am willing to overlook offense at these positions is because acquiring shortstops and catchers who can hit is often a cost-prohibitive strategy. Furthermore, I’m typically not picking high enough in the draft to select the top prospects at these positions. That’s OK, because as long as you get defense from shortstop and catcher, you can work around those players’ batting deficiencies. But to do so you need to be able to pinch-hit with impunity for your light-hitting shortstop and catcher, both of whom will typically be batting seventh, eighth or ninth in the lineup. The best way to feel secure about pulling your plus defensive shortstop or catcher from the game is to have another shortstop with 2 range and catcher with a —2 arm on the bench to serve as substitutes.

Overall, it’s a fine idea to stock a strong-armed backup catcher, regardless, because a —2 or —3 arm behind the plate will pair well with most closers, who often struggle to hold runners close. Selected closers with their hold ratings in the 2016 set: Wade Davis (+4), Dellin Betances (+9), Kenley Jansen (+5), Aroldis Chapman (+5) and Craig Kimbrel (+9).

Catchers for playoff teams usually have strong arms, and starting pitchers for those teams often have good hold ratings, particularly in a 20-team league. This combination can dampen the impact of a stolen base-centric offense in the playoffs, when successful steals will be harder to come by.

However, players with great steal ability will often be able to capitalize on relievers, who typically cannot hold runners as well as starters. (The top 30 starters have an average hold rating of about 0, while that rating for the top 30 relievers is about +2.) Additionally, speedy players are important to offensive functionality because they are more likely to advance from first-to-third or from second-to-home on base hits. Those runs add up, so don’t overlook team speed. Jus don’t count on the stolen base being a key postseason strategy.

While teams can win in the regular season without a great strikeout pitching staff, the postseason is a different animal. Playoff lineups tend to become deeper because managers no longer have to worry about usage limitations. Benches tend to be deeper, too, because teams can carry fewer pitchers in the postseason. So make sure your pitching staff comes armed with plenty of strikeout units, for the strikeout truly is the pitcher’s best friend. A third strike requires no assist from the defense and always prevents base runners from advancing. A well-timed strikeout can absolve many sins.

Think of how frustrated you feel when your No. 3 and No. 4 batters strike out with a runner in scoring position to end an inning. Having a high-strikeout staff can inflict that pain on your opponent. Because base runners are going to happen, you want to be the team whose pitching staff strands the most opposing runners in scoring position.